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Abstract
The paper shows that contrary to conventional wisdom an
endogenous growth economy with human capital and alterna-
tive payment mechanisms can robustly explain major facets of
the long run inflation experience. A negative inflation-growth
relation is explained, including a striking non-linearity found re-
peatedly in empirical studies. A set of Tobin (1965) eﬀects are
also explained and, further, linked in magnitude to the growth
eﬀects through the interest elasticity of money demand. Undis-
closed previously, this link helps fill out the intuition of how the
inflation experience can be plausibly explained in a robust fashion
with a model extended to include credit as a payment mechanism.
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1 Introduction
The evidence on the eﬀect of inflation on growth has continued to show
a strong negative relation. Recent panel studies report strong inflation
eﬀects, both for developed and developing country samples. Further in
the evidence has emerged a striking nonlinearity of this eﬀect. Here
there is a stronger negative eﬀect of inflation at lower rates of inflation,
and this becomes weaker as the inflation rate rises. This still makes for
a rising cumulative eﬀect of inflation rate increases, but it makes for a
significantly weaker, negative, marginal eﬀect on growth as the rate of
inflation becomes higher.1
The achievement of the theoretical literature in replicating such re-
sults has been more mixed. It has been unclear whether a monetary
general equilibrium economy with a payments technology can explain
the evidence of how inflation aﬀects economic growth and other related
activity. One emphasis has been on calibrating the marginal eﬀect on
growth of an increase in the inflation rate, from a level typically of 10%,
and then matching that to the average estimates in the empirical liter-
ature. A variety of endogenous growth models have been oﬀered in this
regard, with widely varying results. For example, both Chari, Jones, and
Manuelli (1996), using human capital, and Dotsey and Sarte (2000), us-
ing an AK model with uncertainty, present endogenous growth models
with cash-in-advance technologies in which inflation has an insignificant
eﬀect on growth. In contrast, for example, both Gomme (1993), in a hu-
man capital model with a cash-in-advance constraint, and Haslag (1998),
1A debate has arisen on the eﬀects of inflation below certain "threshold" rates of
inflation, with some findings of insignificant inflation eﬀects at inflation rates below
the threshold. But this rate has been found to be close to 0 for developed country
samples. In developing country samples, the threshold tends to be higher, near
10%, but a strong negative eﬀect is typically re-established at all rates of inflation
in all samples when instrumental variables are used, as in Ghosh and Phillips (1998)
and in Gillman, Harris, and Matyas (2004). These studies also find the marked
nonlinearity, as do Khan and Senhadji (2000) and Judson and Orphanides (1996).
Bruno and Easterly (1998) provide statistical averages of high inflation episodes
whereby high inflation is correlated with lower growth rates than both before and
after the episode; Gylfason and Herbertsson (2001) and Chari, Jones, and Manuelli
(1996) provide reviews of earlier evidence of a negative inflation eﬀect; Barro (2001)
finds a significant negative eﬀect while emphasizing human capital.
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in an AK model with money used for bank reserves, find a significant
eﬀect of inflation on growth.2 Thus these models have been ambivalent.
And in focusing on just one level of the inflation rate, this literature has
begged the question of how inflation aﬀects growth over a wide range of
inflation rates, and on whether the models can replicate the nonlinear
profile of the inflation-growth eﬀect. Also, after a strong appearance
in the older exogenous growth literature, the recent growth literature
has largely ignored the issue of whether the models generate empirically
consistent Tobin (1965) eﬀects.3
The main contribution of the paper here is that it presents a model in
which a reasonable calibration can account for the empirical evidence,
across the range of inflation rates, on inflation and growth. It does
this in a robust fashion, and with an extension of a standard model
using human capital and cash-in-advance. The paper also shows that
the inflation-growth explanation is fully consistent with evidence on the
existence of the Tobin (1965)-like eﬀects, including a rise in output per
eﬀective labor, even as the balanced-path growth rate declines as a re-
sult of an inflation rate increase.4 Further it presents a novel, systemic,
link between the strength of the growth eﬀect and the strength of the
Tobin (1965) evidence. This fills another gap in the theoretical liter-
ature and opens up a new line of model predictions that have yet to
2Dotsey and Sarte (2000) also present a deterministic AK version of the Stockman
(1981) model in which there is a significant negative eﬀect. And in an more robust
reformulation of the Haslag (1998) model, using instead a cash-in-advance approach,
Gillman and Kejak (2004b) also find this strong negative eﬀect. For a comparison of
such models, see Gillman and Kejak (2004a)
3For example, neither Dotsey and Ireland (1996), Aiyagari, Braun, and Eckstein
(1998), or Gomme (1993) indicate Tobin type results, although Gomme (1993) is
clearly consistent with them. The original Tobin (1965) eﬀect is within an exogenous
growth model in which an increase in the inflation rate causes an increase in the
capital to labor ratio and in per capita output; see Walsh (1998) for a review. Ahmed
and Rogers (2000) compare the Tobin (1965) eﬀect across various exogenous growth
models. Gillman and Kejak (2004a) compare Tobin-like eﬀects across endogenous
growth models.
4Ahmed and Rogers (2000) report long run US evidence showing that inflation has
had a negative eﬀect on the real interest rate historically, which would be expected
if inflation causes the capital to eﬀective labor ratio to rise as in the Tobin (1965)
eﬀect. Gillman and Nakov (2003) report long run US and UK evidence of an increase
in the capital to eﬀective labor ratio as a result of inflation.
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be empirically examined: that the magnitude of the Tobin (1965) ef-
fect is roughly proportional to the magnitude of the growth eﬀect, and
that these magnitudes vary monotonically from higher to lower as the
inflation rate increases.
The key mechanism that gives our model the added flexibility to ex-
plain the evidence is the ability of the representative consumer to choose
between competing payment mechanisms, money and credit, so that in
equilibrium the marginal cost of each is equal. With such credit available
to purchase the good, the nonlinearity is greatly magnified. When infla-
tion rises up, the exchange cost of goods rises, but with credit available
it rises by less than otherwise. So the consumer substitutes from goods
to leisure, but uses credit to decrease the amount of substitution towards
leisure. And this credit is relied upon increasingly more as the inflation
rate goes up, and leisure is relied upon increasingly less as a substitution
channel. This is because the marginal utility of goods gets increasingly
high as less goods are consumed, while the marginal utility of leisure
becomes increasingly lower as more leisure is consumed. This inflation-
induced distortion in the marginal rate of substitution between goods
and leisure is alleviated by the consumer’s use of credit, and so accord-
ingly the credit gets used more as the distortion gets bigger. And this
results despite the increasing marginal cost of credit use, and in a way
that is robust to the nature of the marginal cost specification. Because
credit gets used increasingly more, and leisure is used increasingly less as
a substitution channel, the inflation-growth nonlinearity results. Leisure
plays a key role in determining the growth rate: increased leisure use
causes a lower return on human capital and a lower growth rate. So the
use of increasingly less leisure makes for the decrease in the growth rate
to be of increasingly lower magnitude, as the inflation rate rises. The
resulting inflation-growth profile is shown to be very nonlinear compared
to the model without credit and it qualitatively matches the profile in
the evidence, unlike in the previous literature.
The use of credit has a residual implication for the use of money.
And the nature of the model’s money demand function is an alterna-
tive way to explain the basis for the inflation-growth nonlinearity. The
3
money demand can be described as being similar to a general equilibrium
version of the Cagan (1956) function, in that it has an approximately
constant semi-interest elasticity. This means that as the inflation rate
rises, the interest elasticity rises substantially in magnitude. And this
results because of the decreasing use of real money as credit is instead
used to ameliorate the rising goods—to-leisure inflation-induced distor-
tion, as the inflation rate rises. As part of this rising magnitude of the
interest elasticity, in the model with credit, the use of money is much
more interest elastic at all levels of the inflation rate relative to the same
model without credit available.5 And the approximate semi-interest elas-
ticity is a testable model implication that has substantial support, such
as in recent international panel evidence by Mark and Sul (2002). It
thereby provides a parallel dimension to the nonlinear inflation-growth
evidence.6
In particular, the rising interest elasticity and its correspondence
to the nonlinearity of the inflation-growth profile involves a previously
unreported systemic link between the strength of the growth and of
the Tobin (1965) eﬀects: when the inflation rate is low and the money
demand function is in the relatively inelastic range, the growth and
Tobin (1965) eﬀects are both marginally stronger, that is, of greater
magnitude. When the inflation rate is relatively high and the money
demand is in a relatively elastic range, these eﬀects are weak, of small
magnitude. Credit takes most of the substitution burden, instead of
leisure, of an increase in the inflation rate when the level of the inflation
rate is already high. This results in less growth and capital reallocation
eﬀects in re-equilibrating the return on human and physical capital at a
lower rate of return.
Alternative solutions to the problem, of explaining the inflation ex-
perience, that rely on popular existing payment mechanisms all face
inadequacies. The Lucas (1988) model with a standard payment mech-
anism potentially can produce both significant calibrated eﬀects of the
5As shown in a related model in Gillman (1993).
6Another testable hypothesis here is the models ability to explain velocity; in a
closely related model, Gillman and Kejak (2004b) are able to explain velocity trends
for an array of monetary aggregates.
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inflation-growth eﬀect as well as the Tobin (1965) eﬀects, but it yields a
weakly non-linear inflation-growth profile that is strained to match the
evidence. Models with Lucas and Stokey (1983) cash goods and credit
goods, but without a payments mechanism specified for credit, can only
explain the eﬀects of inflation through the agent’s preference for credit
goods versus cash goods. The lack of microeconomic evidence for this
dichotomy makes the model diﬃcult to calibrate in a non-arbitrary way.
And while it has been common to interpret leisure as the credit good,
making leisure the credit good in the endogenous growth models simply
reduces the model back to the cash-only model with goods and leisure in
the utility function.7 Shopping time economies, a now commonly used
alternative approach, in one sense improve on other standard payments
mechanisms by allowing time to be used as a substitute to using money.
But it is unclear what this shopping time is meant to represent as it has
no obvious market analogy. With little to guide the specification, the
fashion has been to use a constant interest elasticity to set the shop-
ping time parameters, similar to how the preference-for-money parame-
ters have been set in the money-in-the-utility function approach.8 Some
have interpreted shopping time as banking time, but have not taken the
approach of modeling any part of banking. This is precisely what we do
with our credit sector. And the result is a Cagan (1956)-like strongly
rising interest elasticity, not a constant one, that is robust to a range
of credit production function parameters, and is key to explaining the
nonlinear nature of the evidence.
2 The Economy with Goods, Human Capital, and
Exchange Production
2.1 The Consumer Problem
The representative consumer’s utility at time t depends on goods con-
sumption, ct, and leisure, xt, in the constant elasticity form. Lifetime
utility is
7Hodrick, Kocherlakota, and Lucas (1991) found a Lucas and Stokey (1983)-type
economy unable to explain velocity movements.
8See Goodfriend (1997), Lucas (2000), and Gavin and Kydland (1999).
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U0 =
∞Z
0
e−ρt
c1−θt x
α(1−θ)
t
1− θ dt. (1)
Output of goods, denoted by yt, can be turned costlessly into phys-
ical capital. Both goods output and human capital are produced with
physical capital and human capital -indexed labor in constant-returns-
to-scale functions. Let kt and ht denote the stocks of physical capital
and human capital, with the fixed depreciation rate of the capital stocks
denoted by δk and δh. Let sGt, and sHt denote the fraction of capital that
the agent uses in the goods production and human capital production,
whereby
sGt + sHt = 1, (2)
and sGtkt, and sHtkt are the amounts of capital used in each sector.
Similarly, let lGt, lHt, and lFt denote the fraction of time the agent uses in
the goods, human capital, and credit sectors. This makes the allocation
of time constraint
lGt + lHt + lFt = 1− xt, (3)
and making lGtht, lHtht, and lFtht the eﬀective labor in each sector.
With β, ε ∈ [0, 1] and AG and AH being positive shift parameters,
the goods production function is
yt = AG (sGtkt)
1−β (lGtht)
β
. (4)
The marginal product of capital sGtkt, denoted by rt , and the marginal
product of eﬀective labor lGtht, denoted by wt, are
rt=(1− β)AG (sGtkt)−β (lGtht)β , (5)
wt=βAG (sGtkt)
1−β (lGtht)
β−1
. (6)
The human capital equation of motion, given h0 > 0, is
.
ht = AH [(1− sGt) kt]1−ε[(1− lGt − lFt − xt)h]ε − δhht. (7)
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Note that this human capital investment equation is the same as in
Lucas (1988) except that there is also physical capital used as an input
along with the eﬀective labor. This follows the King and Rebelo (1990)
extension of the Lucas (1988) model which makes it more suitable for
calibration purposes. While in the Lucas (1988) model the growth rate of
human capital is proportional to the labor time devoted to human capital
accumulation, or to "learning", here the growth rate is a combination of
the fraction of time and the fraction of capital devoted to human capital
accumulation. In both the Lucas (1988) model and this extension, the
balanced-path growth rate equals the human capital stock growth rate,
and both are reduced when leisure time increases.
The goods output forms an input into the Becker (1965) household
production of the consumption good ct. The goods used as an input
for producing the consumption are denoted by yct . The other input is
exchange, denoted by yet, which enters the production function fc(·) :
ct = fc(yct, yet). (8)
The production function for the consumption good is assumed to be
Leontieﬀ, with the isoquant ray from the origin having a slope of one:
ct= yct, (9)
ct= yet. (10)
This technology ensures that the amount of consumption goods equals
the amount of physical goods, and that the value of the physical goods
is equal to the value of the amount that is paid (or exchanged) for the
goods. This one-to-one relation is the most intuitively appealing; other
specifications are possible but would require some extended justification.
The exchange in turn is produced using two inputs: real money bal-
ances, denoted by mt , and real credit, denoted by dt. These inputs are
perfect substitutes, implying that
yet = mt + dt. (11)
Real money balances are defined as the nominal money stock, de-
noted byMt , divided by the nominal price of goods output, denoted by
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Pt ; mt ≡ Mt/Pt. The initial nominal money stock M0 is given to the
consumer. Additional money stock is transferred to the consumer ex-
ogenously in a lump sum fashion by an amount Vt . The consumer uses
the money to buy some fraction of the output goods with money, and
the rest with credit. Let at ∈ (0, 1] denote the fraction of output goods
bought with money.9 Then the agents demand for money is constrained
to be this fraction of goods purchased. In real terms,
mt = atyct. (12)
Substitution from equation (9) gives a Clower (1967) constraint:
mt= atct; (13)
Mt=Ptatct. (14)
Credit demand is the residual fraction of output goods purchases,
dt = (1− at)yct, (15)
or substituting in from equation (9),
dt = (1− at)ct. (16)
With γ ∈ (0, 1), and AF a shift parameter, the credit production
function is specified as
dt = AF (lFtht)
γc
1−γ
t . (17)
This function can be interpreted using duality. Because the total cost
of production in the credit sector is the wage bill of the eﬀective labor,
wtlFtht, equation (17) implies the marginal cost ( MCt ) function of
MCt = (wt/γ)A
−1/γ
F (dt/ct)
(1−γ)/γ
. (18)
With γ < 0.5, this gives a marginal cost of credit output, per unit of
consumption, that rises at an increasing rate as in a traditional U-shaped
cost curve. Figure 1 graphs the three cases of γ = 0.3 (thicker line),
γ = 0.5 (middle, straight, line) and γ = 0.7 (and with wt = AF = 0.2 ).
9An equilibrium with a = 0 does not have well-defined nominal prices.
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Figure 1. Marginal Cost of Credit
A rising marginal cost function per unit of consumption is the same
devise used in Gillman (1993). The diﬀerence is that in that model there
was a continuum of goods and of stores each with a diﬀerent time cost
of supplying credit to buy their good. In aggregate the stores present an
upward sloping marginal cost curve, so that a unique equilibrium with
the nominal interest exists at each nominal interest rate. However here
there is only one consumption good and one credit production function,
with γ being the diminishing returns parameter that determines the
shape of the curve; the unique equilibrium results as long as γ < 1, al-
though γ > 0.5 seems unlikely in that they indicate a marginal cost that
rises at a decreasing rate in contrast to typical industrial organization
evidence.
The upward sloping cost curve, for example, with γ = 0.3 as in Fig-
ure 1, can also be interpreted in terms of the value-added of the credit
sector. This requires an explicit price for the credit service through a
decentralization of the sector.10 Given the decentralization, it is found
that the price of the credit service is the nominal interest rate. In mar-
ket clearing equilibrium, this price equals the marginal cost given above.
And indeed the equality of the nominal interest rate and the marginal
cost of credit is one of the below key equilibrium conditions (equation
(32)). This "price" can also be used to define the value-added, or to-
tal revenues as in national accounts, of the credit sector; this equals
10See Gillman and Kejak (2004b).
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the nominal interest rate factored by the quantity of the credit sup-
plied. Given the assumed production function, in equilibrium it can
be shown that this value-added is proportional to the cost of produc-
tion ( (Rc(1− a)) / (wlFh) = γ). This gives another way to interpret
the assumed production specification. Even more simply the specifi-
cation implies that the per unit marginal cost is higher than average
cost by a fixed proportion for all levels of credit output, resulting in a
constant profit rate. Thus the assumption is the same as assuming an
upward sloping marginal cost curve, proportional to average cost, with
a constant profit rate, which has intuition based firmly in standard price
theory.
Note that the output of such a service sector is necessarily propor-
tional to aggregate consumption. Factoring out this proportionality fac-
tor to determine what is being produced gives the share of the output
for which the service is provided. If it is also assumed that the produc-
tion function has diminishing returns, then the production of the share
necessarily includes an "externality" eﬀect from the aggregate consump-
tion. Were constant returns to scale specified for the service, while at the
same time there is a substitute price that exhibits a constant marginal
cost, which is what the nominal interest rate presents for the marginal
cost of real money, then there is no unique equilibrium between the two
alternatives. Thus the production function for credit must be specified
with diminishing returns in order to have a unique equilibrium, and as
a service proportional to aggregate consumption, it must include the
externality eﬀect. However consider an illustration of what this really
means in the model economy. A credit card company such as American
Express, in a decentralized setting, would maximize profit while taking
as given howmuch is spent on goods for consumption. American Express
would not try to change this goods expenditure but must consider it in
making its optimal credit supply available to the consumer. By making
its inputs grow as the consumption of goods grows, it can maintain its
share of supplying credit. This simply means that if the aggregate con-
sumption increases, and the credit sector does not increase its eﬀective
labor proportionally, then it will lose its share of output for which it
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provides the service.
Setting credit demand equal to credit supply, in equations (16) and
(17),
(1− at) = AF (lFtht/ct)γ. (19)
Substituting into equation (14) for at from equation (19), the money and
credit constraints can be written as
Mt =
µ
1−AF
µ
lFtht
ct
¶γ¶
Ptct. (20)
2.2 Government Money Supply
The initial money stock M0 is given to the representative agent, and
the only role of the government is to change the money supply from its
initial value. To do this, the government transfers to the consumer each
period an exogenous lump sum money supply of Vt at a constant rate of
σ;
.
M t = Vt = σMt. (21)
The stock Vt is the inflation “proceeds” that result when the government
buys output/capital (they are costlessly interchangeable) with freshly
printed fiat and then gives this (thereby producing real money) to the
consumer as an income transfer. Net government spending equals zero
and is omitted for notational simplification. The only eﬀect of such
“production” is a relative price distortion if the inflation rate ends up
non-optimal.
In real terms, dividing equation (21) by Pt implies that the govern-
ment’s investment rate in real money is the supply growth rate minus
the inflation-based depreciation of π ≡
.
P t/Pt :
.
mt = (σ − π)mt. (22)
2.3 Definition of Equilibrium
The consumer’s total nominal financial wealth, denoted by Qt, is the
sum of the money stockMt and the nominal value of the physical capital
stock Ptkt:
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Qt=Mt + Ptkt; (23)
.
Qt=
.
M t + Pt
.
kt +
.
P tkt. (24)
The consumer’s change in the financial wealth over time,
.
Qt, is equal
to the sum of Vt by equation (21), plus the nominal value of the change
in physical capital Pt
.
kt, and plus the nominal price appreciation factor
.
P tkt. The Pt
.
kt term is the output of goods, which can be written in terms
of marginal products using equation (5) and (6), minus the output of
goods that are purchased for consumption, which by equation (9) equals
Ptct, and minus capital depreciation Ptδkkt. This gives
.
Qt = PtrtsGtkt + PtwtlGtht + Vt − Ptct − Ptδkkt +
.
P tkt. (25)
Equations (4), (5), (6), (25) and (21) imply the social resource constraint
yt = ct +
.
kt + δkkt. (26)
Given M0, k0, h0, and the normalization of P0 = 1, equilibrium con-
sists of the values of the prices {rt, wt, Pt}∞t=0 and the allocations {ct, xt,
sGt, lGt, lFt, Mt, Qt, kt}∞t=0 that satisfy i) the representative consumer’s
maximization of the lifetime utility (1) subject to the constraints in equa-
tions (7), (20), (23), and (25), taking as given the prices and the transfer
Vt, ii) the firm’s maximization problem taking prices as given, iii) the
government supply of money in equation (21), and iv) the clearing of all
markets in the economy, with equation (26) for the goods market.
2.4 Balanced Growth Path
On the balanced-growth path, ct , kt , ht , mt and yt grow at the same
rate, denoted by g. The variables xt , lGt, lFt , lHt , sGt, sHt , wt , rt are
stationary.
A balanced growth path reduced set of equilibrium conditions are set
out below, with time subscripts dropped and assuming δk = δh:
uc(c, x)
ux(c, x)
=
x
αc
=
1 + aR+ wlFh/c
wh
, (27)
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wr
=
β
1− β
sGk
lGh
=
ε
1− ε
sHk
lHh
, (28)
g≡
.
c
c
=
.
k
k
=
.
h
h
=
.
m
m
=
r − δk − ρ
θ
(29)
=
ε(1− x)AH [(sHtkt) / (lHtht)]1−ε − δh − ρ
θ
, (30)
r − δk +
.
P
P
≡ R, (31)
R = w/
Ã
γAF
µ
lFtht
ct
¶γ−1!
. (32)
Because of the novel nature of the credit sector, a focus on this last
equation (32) helps describe the model. In the Baumol (1952) model,
the consumer chooses between two payment mechanisms: the use of
money and the use of banking in which interest is earned on the income.
The banking of these models is similar to the credit in the model here.
Also similar is that the consumer optimally chooses between the two
according to the cost of each relative to the other. This choice yields
the only equilibrium condition in Baumol (1952). There is no such mar-
gin in the standard cash-only Lucas (1980) or Lucas and Stokey (1983)
economies. The model here follows Baumol (1952) and adds this as
an additional margin relative to the standard cash-in-advance economy
with the following equilibrium condition. The cost of money, R, equals
the marginal cost of credit, which is the marginal factor cost of eﬀective
labor in the credit sector, wt, divided by the marginal product of labor
in the credit sector. This is a standard microeconomic pricing condition
for factor market equilibrium. The existence of this condition, not found
in Baumol (1952), takes the important margin that Baumol (1952) de-
velops, and places it securely within microeconomic theory, while using
the single-good standard neoclassical growth framework.11 This makes
standard monetary theory tractable back to the production structure of
credit, unlike in Baumol (1952).
11One comparison in the literature to equation (32) can be found in an innovative
paper by Canzoneri and Diba (2003); it follows more of the Tobin (1956) approach
by specifying bonds that back up a non-money exchange service (not dissimilar to
credit), and it uses this to solve the price indeterminacy problem.
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The marginal rate of substitution of goods relative to leisure is given
by equation (27), and can be understood as the ratio of the shadow price
of the consumption good to leisure. The shadow price of consumption
goods is one, the goods cost, plus the exchange cost of aR + wlFh/c
per unit. If only money is used in exchange, this is just the nominal
interest R. But with credit also used this exchange cost is less than R
and can be expressed as a weighted average of money and credit use, or
1+aR+(1−a)γR. Or with a focus on a, this writes as 1+γR+aR(1−γ).
When the inflation rate goes up the cost of exchange rises. But because of
substitution towards credit, the cash share a falls, the shadow exchange
price rises by less than proportionately to R, and so it rises by less than
in the cash-only model. Thus there is substitution towards leisure as in
the cash-only model, but less such substitution.
Other balanced-growth path equilibrium conditions here show that
the growth rate equals the return on capital minus the time prefer-
ence rate, in the log-utility case, and that the returns of human and
physical capital are equal; with equal depreciation rates, r = ε(1 −
x)AH [(sHtkt) / (lHtht)]
1−ε . This last expression highlights how the in-
creased leisure can act to decrease the growth rate, while the Tobin
(1965) eﬀect towards greater capital intensity in both goods and human
capital sectors, as w/r increases because of an inflation increase, can
partially oﬀset the decrease in the growth rate.
2.5 Eﬀect of Inflation on Balanced-Growth Path
Technically, the eﬀect of a change in the inflation rate on the balanced-
growth path equilibrium can be solved analytically for certain parameter
specifications by solving all equations in terms of leisure and then solving
for the change in leisure from one implicit equation in terms of only
leisure. Then the main results follow and can be summarized in the
following two lemmas. For analytic tractability, log-utility is assumed
and in addition no physical capital is assumed for the second lemma and
its two corollaries. These assumptions are relaxed in the calibration.
Note that the results state what happens when there is an increase
in the money supply growth rate. The inflation rate, as in all such
14
models, increases because the exogenous rate of money supply growth
is assumed to increase. The inflation rate goes up a bit more than the
money supply growth rate increase, because the balanced-path growth
rate falls somewhat, while the sum of the inflation rate and the balanced-
path growth rate are constrained to equal the money supply growth rate;
from equation (22), π = σ−g. So while this is generally thought of as the
eﬀect of inflation on growth in such models, and this is the usage made
in this paper, the inflation-growth relation is more precisely a result of
the money supply changes.
Lemma 1 An increase in the money supply growth rate σ causes an
increase in leisure time, a decrease in the real interest rate, an increase
in the capital to eﬀective labor ratio in the goods and human capital
production sectors, an increase in the goods capital to output ratio, and
a decrease in the balanced-growth path growth rate. It is assumed that
θ = 1 , β = ε = γ = 0.5 , AG = AH , and that the change in the money
supply growth rate is evaluated at the Friedman optimum of R = 0.
Proof. Please see Appendix A.1.
The increase in the exchange cost of goods causes a relative decrease
in the opportunity cost of leisure, thereby inducing a shift back in the
supply of labor for goods production, while there is a shift of labor into
credit production. The real wage rises (by less than does the exchange
cost of goods) in order to clear the labor market, inducing firms to
realign inputs towards capital and away from labor. The increase in the
capital to eﬀective labor ratios, across both goods and human capital
production sectors, lowers the marginal product of capital and the real
interest rate.12 Here the rising capital to eﬀective labor eﬀect marks the
Tobin (1965) eﬀect in the human capital model, rather than the rising
capital per worker as in the Solow exogenous growth model without
leisure. Output per eﬀective labor also goes up in a way similar to
Tobin (1965). And a lower real interest rate from an inflation increase
can be viewed as part of this Tobin (1965) eﬀect. But unlike in Tobin
(1965), here the growth rate goes down.
12We thank an anonymous referee for a suggested description here.
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Note that in the Lucas (1988) model, only eﬀective labor is used in
human capital accumulation and there is no leisure in the utility func-
tion; in this case the rate of return on human capital in equilibrium
is just proportional to the time spent accumulating human capital, or
AHlH .When the time spent in human capital production goes down, the
growth rate goes down. In the monetary extension of the human capital
growth model, leisure plays a critical role with respect to inflation. For
example, with no physical capital and log-utility (as assumed in the next
Lemma), the rate of return on human capital is proportional to the time
spent working in all sectors, or AH (1− x) . And in this case the change
in the total time spent working (1− x) (in all three sectors) is exactly
equal to the change in the time spent in human capital accumulation
lH ; here the Lucas (1988) explanation of the growth rate, as being pro-
portional to the time spent in human capital accumulation, is perfectly
interchangeable with the time spent working. With physical capital the
growth rate more generally depends on the rate of return to human cap-
ital, in which a falling amount of leisure time because of inflation is the
primary eﬀect, while an increase in the capital to eﬀective labor ratio is
of secondary magnitude, moderating the decrease in the growth rate.
Lemma 2 The magnitude of the change in the balanced-path growth
rate, from a change in the money supply growth rate, is determined in-
versely by the magnitude of the interest elasticity of money demand,
given that β = ε = θ = 1, and given that the interest elasticity is less
than one in magnitude. Further with a cash-only restriction ( a ≡ 1),
the inflation-growth profile is exactly linear.
Proof. Please see Appendix A.2.
This is the log-utility and no physical capital case. At the Friedman
(1969) optimum of R = 0, the marginal rate of substitution between
goods and leisure is undistorted and leisure is a close substitute for goods
because there is no tax wedge to force their marginal utilities to diverge.
As the inflation rate rises from the optimal rate, leisure tends to be used
readily to avoid the inflation tax, while credit use is relegated to a sec-
ondary role in avoiding inflation, despite the fact that the marginal cost
16
of credit is relatively low at low inflation rates since there is a rising
marginal cost curve. However at higher rates of inflation, the inflation
tax wedge makes the use of more leisure increasingly less attractive rel-
ative to the use of more credit because leisure’s diminishing marginal
utility, and goods increasing marginal utility, in eﬀect dominate the ris-
ing cost of the credit. Credit is used increasingly more and therefore
the interest elasticity of money demand is increasingly high. Because
the growth rate eﬀect is dependent directly on how much leisure is used
when inflation rises, this eﬀect is strongest when the inflation rate is
rising up from the optimum and the wedge in the goods-leisure rate of
substitution is at its smallest. The growth rate falls by increasingly less
as the inflation rate rises, and the interest elasticity of money demand
rises in magnitude.
At a unitary interest elasticity, the growth rate stops falling and actu-
ally begins to rise. However the baseline calibration puts this juncture at
a hyperinflation rate of inflation, above which the government makes less
seigniorage anyway. This suggests that only the range of the inflation
rate that induces a less than unitary elasticity is likely to be empirically
relevant. Note the relation of this result to Eckstein and Leiderman
(1992). They find that seigniorage in Israel rises at a steadily decreasing
rate, which they model with a money demand derived from putting real
money balances in the utility function. Our nonlinear inflation-growth
profile, and the rising magnitude of interest elasticity, correspond di-
rectly to a seigniorage that rises at a diminishing rate. As in the Cagan
(1956) model (but unlike that of Eckstein and Leiderman (1992)), the to-
tal seigniorage would begin to fall once the interest elasticity rose above
one in magnitude, but we suggest that this is not an empirically relevant
long run range for the elasticity.
Corollary 1 The magnitude of the interest elasticity of the goods-normalized
money demand rises with an increase in the inflation rate because the
magnitude of the elasticity of substitution between money and credit, and
the share of credit in purchases, each rise with an increase in the nominal
interest rate.
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Proof. Please see Appendix A.3.
A standard factor-price elasticity of substitution between real money
and credit, as the two inputs into producing exchange, can be defined as
the percentage change in inputs over the percentage change in marginal
products. Then the interest elasticity of money demand can be ex-
pressed as a price elasticity of the derived input demand, in terms of the
elasticity of substitution. In particular, the interest elasticity of money
demand (ηRm) equals the (negative) share of the other input credit (1−a)
as factored by the elasticity of substitution between money and credit
(), plus a scale eﬀect (ηRc ); or η
R
m = (1− a)+ ηRc .13 The scale eﬀect is
of secondary importance in terms of magnitude, and when normalizing
the money demand by consumption, this term drops out (this is the
only term in the cash-only economy). As the inflation rate rises, leisure
becomes a worse substitute, even while money and credit remain perfect
technical substitutes (equation (11)). This increases the two-factor elas-
ticity of substitution; the share of credit 1− a also rises unambiguously.
Note that the isoquant for producing exchange is not linear because of
the role of leisure.14
The result is insensitive to the specification of the parameters in
the credit production function. Given that γ ∈ (0, 1) and AF > 0,
there is a rising marginal cost of credit, as the credit use per unit of
consumption increases. The degree of diminishing returns, γ, aﬀects
shape of the marginal cost curve in an unambiguous way, but aﬀects
the normalized interest elasticity in an ambiguous fashion that depends
on the calibration; the shift parameter AF does has a clear eﬀect on
the magnitude of the normalized interest elasticity (as indicated in the
next corollary). But regardless of these specifications, it is the fact of
the existence of the credit (with a rising marginal cost), combined with
the nature of the goods to leisure marginal rate of substitution, that
13See for example Marshall (1920) or a standard microeconomic text on derived
demand elasticiticies.
14See Gillman (2000) for another example of the input price elasticity as applied to
real money, in a model using the store continuum as in Gillman (1993), Dotsey and
Ireland (1996) and Aiyagari, Braun, and Eckstein (1998). Such a curved isoquant
between real money and credit in general equilibrium is graphed in Gillman (1995).
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produces the corollary results, of an increasing interest elasticity with
inflation rate increases. This can alternatively be seen by writing the
normalized elasticity as (1− a) = − [γ/ (1− γ)] [(1− a) /a] . All that is
necessary for this elasticity to rise in magnitude is that the normalized
money usage (a) falls as the inflation rate rises.
Corollary 2 The magnitude of the interest elasticity of the goods-normalized
money demand rises with an increase in productivity in the credit sec-
tor, as indicated by an increase in the total factor productivity AF of the
credit production function.
Proof. Please see Appendix A.4.
This corollary brings in one additional factor, the productivity of the
credit sector. This can be important for example in analyzing changes
in financial regulation. A deregulation is similar to a decrease in the
implicit tax on the credit sector that has the eﬀect of shifting up the
productivity parameter AF . Continuing the example, deregulation here
has the eﬀect on increasing the demand for credit at each nominal inter-
est rate, making the demand for money in eﬀect more interest elastic.
The fall in the price of a substitute to money causes a shift back in
the money demand function. Given the same nominal interest rate, this
moves the consumer "up" the money demand function to a more interest
elastic point.
3 Calibration
The analytic results of the lemmas and corollaries, on how inflation
eﬀects the balanced-growth equilibrium, are shown to apply as well in
the general model through its calibration. The calibration makes clear
that the model produces a significant eﬀect of inflation on growth, within
the range of empirical estimates reviewed for example by Chari, Jones,
and Manuelli (1996), while showing the nonlinearity of this eﬀect, the
existence of Tobin (1965) eﬀects, and the link between the magnitude
of the growth and Tobin (1965) eﬀects. Also the calibration shows the
robustness of the results to a full range of alternative specifications of
the parameters of the credit production function.
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3.1 Assumed Parameter Values
Standard parameters values are assumed as in the literature. Table 1
presents the assumed values for the baseline calibration. Leisure is set
as in Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997); risk aversion and Cobb-Douglas
parameters for goods and human capital sectors as in Gomme (1993);
depreciation rates as in King and Rebelo (1990); growth rate as in Chari,
Jones, and Manuelli (1996); the share of cash is similar to Dotsey and
Ireland (1996); leisure preference is set within the range in the literature.
For the credit sector technology, the degree of diminishing returns is set
to 0.2 as based on the estimated value of this parameter that is found
for the US in the money demand estimation of Gillman and Otto (2002),
a companion paper. This parameter is varied below in Table 4 and a
fuller set of such variations can be found in Gillman and Kejak (2002).
Table 1: Baseline Parameter and Variable Values
Parameters ρ δh δk θ β ε α γ AG AH AF
0.04 0.1 0.1 1.5 0.64 0.64 4.692 0.2 1 0.581 0.801
Variables a x g π lG lH lF
0.7 0.7 0.02 0.05 0.1635 0.1355 0.00098
3.2 The Results
Table 2 shows that the baseline calibration for the negative growth rate
eﬀect of a 10% point increase in the inflation rate is a -0.23 percentage
point change in the growth rate of output, comparable to the range in
Chari, Jones, and Manuelli (1996). Note that the -0.23 indicates that
starting from a baseline of 0.02 percent growth (a 2% growth rate) at an
inflation rate of 0.05, the growth rate falls to 0.0177 when the inflation
rate rises to 0.15. Figure 2a simulates this in the solid line. The negative
growth eﬀect falls in magnitude as the inflation rate rises. This nonlinear
relation, of a marginally decreasing magnitude of the negative growth
eﬀect, has been found empirically in many studies. And this occurs
even while the Tobin (1965) eﬀect is present through a higher output to
eﬀective labor ratio (Figure 2b).
Figure 2a also includes for contrast a dashed line for the cash-only
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economy that is almost linear, contrary to evidence. Additionally for
the economy of Lemma 2, in which there is no physical capital, Figure
2c shows that the inflation growth profile is perfectly linear for the cash-
only economy (dashed line) versus the nonlinear Section 2 model with
credit (solid line).
Table 2 also shows how leisure rises with inflation (Figure 3a), the
real interest rate falls (Figure 3b), the real eﬀective wage rises (Figure
3c), and the capital to eﬀective labor ratio in the goods sector and the
investment to output ratio rise (Figures 3d and 3e). The sectorial real-
locations are supported empirically in Gillman and Nakov (2003), while
supporting evidence for the positive investment rate eﬀect and negative
real interest rate eﬀect are found in Ahmed and Rogers (2000). Figure 3f
simulates the money demand per unit of consumption goods; this is the
inverse, endogenous, consumption velocity and it contrasts for example
to the assumption in Alvarez, Lucas, and Weber (2001) that velocity is
exogenous. In addition, Table 2 shows the link among the magnitude of
the growth and Tobin (1965) eﬀects and the magnitude of the interest
elasticity of money demand.
Table 2: Baseline Calibration of the Eﬀect of Increasing the Inflation
Rate
Baseline
Change in Inflation Rate Change
Variable 5→ 15% 15→ 25% 25→ 35%
Growth Rate g -0.00232 -0.00199 -0.00173
Leisure x 0.00878 0.00824 0.00705
Real Interest Rt r -0.00320 -0.00304 -0.00263
Real Wage w 0.01054 0.01029 0.00914
Capit/Lab Gds (sGk)/(lGh) 0.09800 0.09753 0.08810
Capit/Lab Hum (sHk)/(lHh) 0.09800 0.09753 0.08810
Capit/Output (sGk)/y 0.04086 0.04023 0.03599
Output/Eﬀ.Labor y/(lGh) 0.01647 0.01608 0.01428
Money/Consumption-Goods a -0.04187 -0.03310 -0.02586
Point Est of Int Elast ηmR -0.1276 -0.1757 -0.2220
Table 3 provides a calibration with the goods sector’s capital inten-
sity increased above that of the human capital production sector, with
β = 0.50, instead of β = 0.64 as in the baseline. This shows that with
a greater goods sector capital intensity, the inflation-induced substitu-
tion from labor to capital is marginally greater, and the Tobin (1965)
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and growth eﬀects stronger, relative to the baseline, while the interest
elasticity is of smaller magnitude. This acts to marginally shift up the
inflation-growth profile; Figure 3g shows this with the solid line being
the baseline and with the dashed line having β = 0.50 and all other
parameters as in the baseline.
Table 3: Baseline Calibration Except for an Increase in the Capital
Intensity in Goods Production
Baseline Except β = 0.60
Change in Inflation Rate Change
Variable 5→ 15% 15→ 25% 25→ 35%
Growth Rate g -0.00232 -0.00200 -0.00174
Leisure x 0.00872 0.00820 0.00703
Real Interest Rt r -0.00320 -0.00304 -0.00264
Real Wage w 0.01352 0.01327 0.01183
Capit/Lab Gds (sGk)/(lGh) 0.13379 0.13374 0.12133
Capit/Lab Hum (sHk)/(lHh) 0.11288 0.11284 0.10237
Capit/Output (sGk)/y 0.04510 0.04452 0.03993
Output/Eﬀ.Labor y/(lGh) 0.02254 0.02211 0.01972
Money/Consumption-Goods a -0.04063 -0.03212 -0.02507
Point Est of Int Elast ηmR -0.1238 -0.1699 -0.2143
Table 4 shows the eﬀect of increasing from its baseline value the
parameter that indicates the degree of diminishing returns in the credit
sector. It shows that such increases cause a bigger magnitude of the
growth eﬀect and of the Tobin (1965) eﬀects, and a smaller magnitude
of the interest elasticity. This calibration is done for a neighborhood
of the baseline calibration with respect to changes in γ. Simulation of
the inflation-growth eﬀect with a larger γ show that this acts to pivot
down the inflation-growth profile. Figure 3h shows this with the solid
line being the baseline and with the dashed line having γ = 0.25 and all
other parameters as in the baseline.
While the role of financial development on the inflation-growth eﬀect
has been little studied (although there are sizeable literatures on each
the inflation and growth relation, and the financial development and
growth relation), Gillman, Harris, and Matyas (2004) present evidence
of diﬀerences in the inflation-growth profile for APEC and OECD sam-
ples. The profiles compare closely to Figure 3h in that APEC’s profile is
less steep at every rate of inflation, while the profile starts at about the
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same point, so that the APEC profile appears pivoted up relative to the
OECD profile. The model thus suggests a comparatively greater degree
of diminishing returns in credit production, and a more steeply rising
marginal cost curve, in the APEC region. This oﬀers one explanation
consistent with the diﬀerent inflation-growth results that cannot be pro-
vided with the standard cash-only cash-in-advance exchange technology.
Table 4: The Inflation Eﬀects When Increasing the Degree of Diminish-
ing Returns in Credit Production
Baseline: Inflation Rate 5→ 15% Degree of Diminishing Returns
Change in in Credit Production
Variable γ = 0.2 γ = 0.3 γ = 0.5
Growth Rate g -0.00232 -0.00273 -0.00338
Leisure x 0.00878 0.01148 0.01423
Real Interest Rt r -0.00320 -0.00421 -0.00524
Real Wage w 0.01054 0.01398 0.01769
Capit/Lab Gds (sGk)/(lGh) 0.09800 0.13083 0.16724
Capit/Lab Hum (sHk)/(lHh) 0.09800 0.13083 0.16724
Capit/Output (sGk)/y 0.04091 0.04866 0.06908
Output/Eﬀ.Labor y/(lGh) 0.01647 0.02184 0.02764
Money/Consumption-Goods a -0.04187 -0.05434 -0.03080
Point Est of Int Elast ηmR -0.12757 -0.11737 -0.08745
4 Comparison to Other Payment Mechanisms
One type of comparison that can be further detailed is to use the same
human capital model but with diﬀerent payment mechanisms.
4.1 Cash-only Economy
The most standard is the cash-only economy of Lucas (1980). Here the
consumer can use only money to buy goods. This case results from
the Section 2 model when a ≡ 1 is imposed. Or this can be derived
by having credit be prohibitively expensive ( AF close to zero). Figure
2a (dashed line) shows the resulting inflation-growth profile with the
baseline calibration. The almost linear profile indicates that the growth
rate becomes negative quickly as the inflation rate rises, contrary to
evidence. The cash-only model overstates the inflation eﬀect on growth
at every level of the inflation rate for R > 0, in comparison to the Section
2 model. The reason is that when inflation increases, with cash-only the
consumer can only substitute towards leisure, and so uses more leisure for
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each marginal increase in the inflation rate than if credit was available.
So instead of having much smaller leisure increases as the inflation rate
goes higher, which is what happens when credit is available, the increases
in leisure only decrease in magnitude slightly.
4.2 The Shopping Time Economy
The Lucas (2000) shopping time model focuses on the use of resources in
exchange activity. Calling this activity “shopping time” after McCallum
and Goodfriend (1987), and showing the sense in which it exactly equals
the welfare cost of inflation in the economy (with no leisure), he specifies
the shopping time exchange constraint so as to induce a constant interest
elasticity. This strategy of specifying the exchange technology so as to
have a constant interest elasticity is also used in Goodfriend (1997),
who cites an earlier version of the Lucas (2000) paper, and in Gavin and
Kydland (1999).
By assuming a constant interest elasticity, the free parameters of the
shopping time function can be constrained in a non-arbitrary way. How-
ever the problem with the constant interest elasticity assumption is that
it is in conflict with evidence. Lucas (2000) describes how a constant-
like interest elasticity model seems to breakdown for US data during
the 1980s, after which he concludes that a constant semi-interest elas-
ticity model seems to be the preferred model. Mark and Sul (2002) find
substantial cointegration panel data evidence in support of the constant
semi-interest elasticity model.
If in fact a constant semi-interest elasticity is the appropriate model,
then the key fact here is that the interest elasticity rises as the inter-
est rate rises, rather than remaining constant as in the shopping time
models. In this case the shopping time models are forcing an undue
lack of non-linearity upon the inflation eﬀects with respect to growth
and Tobin (1965) variables. This means that the constant interest elas-
ticity will make the eﬀects too weak for low values of the inflation rate
and too strong for higher values of the inflation rate, depending on the
particulars of which constant interest elasticity is chosen.
The model of section 2 can in fact be viewed as a special case of
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the shopping time economy. The special case is that the shopping time
of the McCallum and Goodfriend (1987) exchange constraint becomes
instead the banking time of an explicit credit production technology.15
The credit technology parameters determine only how quickly the inter-
est elasticity of money demand rises with the inflation rate. Corollary 1
explains why a rising interest elasticity with inflation does not depend
on the exact specification of these parameters, a result confirmed with
calibration. Rather through their eﬀect on the interest elasticity they
determine the degree of nonlinearity of the inflation-growth profile. Ex-
treme values can reproduce the cash-only economy (AF = 0 or γ = 0).
5 Conclusion
The paper shows that, contrary to what has become generally accepted,
growth models with Lucas (1988) human capital, and well-defined pay-
ments mechanisms, can successfully explain major facets of how inflation
aﬀects long run economic activity. First it makes clear that point esti-
mates, of significant magnitude, of the negative eﬀect of inflation on
the balanced-path growth rate can be found with a standard calibra-
tion that is robust to varying the parameters of the credit production
function. Second the credit allows the consumer to use less leisure as in-
flation increases, so that the economy exhibits a significantly non-linear
inflation-growth relation as has been found repeatedly in empirical stud-
ies. Third the model shows that related Tobin (1965) eﬀects are at work
in the economy, with a decrease in the real interest rate to the real wage
ratio, an increase in the capital to eﬀective labor ratios across sectors,
and a rise in the output per eﬀective labor input. This inflation-tax-
induced increase in the output per eﬀective labor hour is a result of the
household trying to moderate the growth rate decrease by realigning
inputs towards capital as labor becomes scarce and leisure in greater
use.
The model has household production of consumption using goods
and exchange. The exchange is produced interchangeably with money
15In a related paper, Gillman and Yerokhin (2003) detail this connection. One
implication is that shopping time function in an endogenous growth setting should
include human capital in its specification, unlike in Love and Wen (1999).
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or a credit sector. This oﬀers a direction alternative to general trans-
action cost models such as the shopping time models. The approach is
related to the cash-credit framework of Aiyagari, Braun, and Eckstein
(1998), who assume a constant semi-interest elasticity of money demand.
Here such a money demand is generated endogenously as the consumer
equalizes the marginal cost of alternative payment mechanisms. As a
result, links between the money demand function and the inflation ef-
fects are pervasive and, unlike previous work, are made explicit. The
money demand’s interest elasticity inversely determines the strength of
the growth and Tobin (1965) eﬀects in a way that fills out intuition
of these events. This presents also an alternative research strategy to-
wards further developing and calibrating such models: to use structural
parameters of the credit production technology in addition to so-called
behavioral parameters of the partial equilibrium money demand func-
tions. This may further advance understanding of how inflation aﬀects
international growth and other aspects of the structure of the economy.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The equilibrium conditions, including the marginal product definitions
in equations (5) and (6), imply that the balanced-growth solution of all of
the variables of the economy can be written in terms of 1−x; in addition
is an implicit equation in 1 − x. The implicit equation, derived from
1−x = lF +lG+lH , is 1−x = r
(1−ε)/β
[AG(1−β)](1−ε)/β
µ
AG
³
lGh
sGk
´β
(r−ρ)+( ch)
³
lHh
sHk
´ε¶
βAG
³
lGh
sGk
´β
+ρ
+
wγ/(γ−1)x
αγAFR1/(γ−1)
h
1+aR+w
³ lF h
c
´i . With ε = β = γ = 0.5, and AG = AH = 1 this
gives the following polynomial in z ≡ (1−x)0.5, where Ω ≡ [AF (σ + ρ)]2 .
0 = −0.5Ωz3+2[2αρΩ−(1+ρΩ)]z2− [4αρ (1 + σ + ρ)−0.5Ω]z+1+ρΩ.
(33)
Diﬀerentiating with respect to σ and z, and solving for ∂z/∂σ, we
have ∂z
∂σ
= (∂Ω/∂σ){−0.5z
3+ρ(2α−1)z2+0.5z+ρ}−4αρ
Ω{1.5z2−2ρ(2α−1)z+0.5}+2z+4αρ(1+σ+ρ) ,where ∂Ω/∂σ = 2A2F (σ + ρ) .
Evaluating ∂z
∂σ
at the optimum of σ + ρ = 0, implies that ∂z
∂σ
= − 2αρ
z+2αρ
.
Since α, ρ > 0 and z = 1 − x ∈ (0, 1), ∂z
∂σ
= ∂(1−x)
∂σ
< 0. Then the
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equilibrium values of all variables can be examined in terms of their
change with respect to 1 − x and σ. With the above parameter re-
strictions these are given by r = 0.5(1 − x)0.5, with ∂r/∂(1 − x) > 0,
and ∂r/∂σ < 0; w = 0.5(1 − x)−0.5, ∂w/∂(1 − x) < 0; ∂w/∂σ > 0;
sGk
lGh
= sHk
lHh
= (1 − x)−1; ∂ (sGk/lGh) /∂σ < 0; (sGk)/y = 1/[r(1 − β)],
∂[y/(sGk)]/∂σ > 0; g = r − δk − ρ, ∂g/∂σ < 0.
Finally we derive the unique solution for x at the optimum. Evaluat-
ing equation (33) at the optimum of σ+ρ = 0, implies that z2+4αρz+
1 = 0. The quadratic equation has two solutions: z1,2 = 2αρ(−1 ±p
1 + 1/(4α2ρ2)). One solution gives a negative x, outside of its feasi-
ble range. And it can be shown that the unique solution for leisure,
x ∈ [0, 1], is 1− 4α2ρ2(−1 +
p
1 + 1/(4α2ρ2))2.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Under the assumptions of β = ε = θ = 1 the economy uses no physical
capital and has log-utility. Here the growth rate is determined by the
marginal product of human capital and is given by g = AH(1− x)− δh,
and ∂g/∂σ = −AH∂x/∂σ. The economy has a closed form solution and
x = (ρα/AH)[(1 + aR + AGlFh/c)/(1 + AGlFh/c). Since R = σ + ρ,
it follows that ∂g/∂σ = ∂g/∂R. Using this fact and the expression for
x, ∂g/∂σ can be written as ∂g/∂R = −αρ[a/(1 + AGlFh/c)][1 + ηaR −
η
lF h/c
R (AGlFh/c)/(1 +AGlFh/c)], where η
a
R is the elasticity of a with re-
spect toR and is given by ηaR = −[γ/(1−γ)][(1−a)/a], and η
lF h/c
R is a sim-
ilar elasticity given by ηlFh/cR = 1/(1−γ). Further, −η
lF h/c
R (AGlFh/c)/(1+
AGlFh/c) = η
c
R, and so 1 + η
a
R − η
lFh/c
R (AGlFh/c)/(1 + AGlFh/c) = 1 +
ηaR+η
c
R = 1+η
m
R , where η
m
R ≤ 0 is the interest elasticity of money demand
in equation (13). Therefore ∂g/∂R = −αρ[a/(1+AGlFh/c)][1+ ηmR ]. At
R = 0, ηmR = 0. As R rises the elasticity becomes increasingly negative,
and 1 + ηmR gets smaller. Because it can be shown that the other term
also falls unambiguously as R rises, that is ∂[a/(1 +AGlFh/c)]/∂R < 0,
the growth rate decrease that occurs for ηmR ≥ −1 becomes increasingly
smaller as R increases; and its decrease is made directly less by the ris-
ing interest elasticity of money demand and the falling magnitude of the
1 + ηmR . Now if a ≡ 1, then from above it is clear that ∂g/∂R = −αρ,
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which implies a linear inflation-growth relation.
A.3 Proof of Corollary 1
Define the elasticity of substitution between cash and credit as  ≡·
∂
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, which is solved as
 = −[γ/(1 − γ)]/a. In turn the interest elasticity of money is ηmR =
ηaR+ η
c
R, and this writes as η
m
R = (1− a) + ηcR. Normalizing the money
demand m by dividing by the goods consumed, c, this gives m/c = a.
And ηaR = (1− a) . Since 1− a = A
1/(1−γ)
F (Rγ/AG)
γ/(1−γ), by equations
(19) and (32), then ∂ (1− a) /∂R ≥ 0, ∂/∂R ≥ 0, and so ∂ηaR/∂R ≤ 0;
for R > 0, ∂ηaR/∂R < 0.
A.4 Proof of Corollary 2
By Lemma 2 and Corollary 1, ηaR = −[γ/(1− γ)][(1− a)/a] =
−[γ/(1 − γ)][A1/(1−γ)F (Rγ/AG)γ/(1−γ)]/[1 − A
1/(1−γ)
F (Rγ/AG)
γ/(1−γ)],
and ∂ηaR/AF ≤ 0 so that the magnitude of ηaR rises as AF rises.
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